Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government by Monahan, Patrick J.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 33, Number 3 (Fall 1995) Article 1
Is the Pearson Airport Legislation
Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on
Contract Repudiation by Government
Patrick J. Monahan
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Monahan, Patrick J.. "Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a Limit on Contract Repudiation by
Government." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 33.3 (1995) : 411-452.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol33/iss3/1
Is the Pearson Airport Legislation Unconstitutional?: The Rule of Law as a
Limit on Contract Repudiation by Government
Abstract
It has long been assumed that Parliament has unlimited power to enact legislation cancelling valid contracts
and denying compensation to any persons affected. This paper challenges that conventional wisdom. The
author argues that the principle of the rule of law requires that governments be accountable in the ordinary
courts for wrongful actions of government officials. This principle is undermined if government is absolved
from any liability for breach of a fairly bargained and valid contract. Thus, legislation purporting to abrogate
contracts and deny compensation is invalid, since it violates the implied limits on legislative authority
associated with the rule of law. The author also explains how protecting contractual expectations in the
manner suggested does not unduly limit Parliamentary sovereignty, and will not result in a wholesale
constitutional entrenchment of property rights.
This article is available in Osgoode Hall Law Journal: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol33/iss3/1
IS THE PEARSON AIRPORT
LEGISLATION
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?: THE RULE
OF LAW AS A LIMIT ON CONTRACT
REPUDIATION BY GOVERNMENT©
PATRICK J. MONAHAN*
It has longbeen assumed that Parliament has unlimited
power to enact legislation cancelling valid contracts and
denying compensation to any persons affected. This
paper challenges that conventional wisdom. The
author argues that the principle of the rule of law
requires that governments be accountable in the
ordinary courts for wrongful actions of government
officials. This principle is undermined if government is
absolved from any liability for breach of a fairly
bargained and valid contract. Thus, legislation
purporting to abrogate contracts and deny
compensation is invalid, since it violates the implied
limits on legislative authority associated with the rule of
law. The author also explains how protecting
contractual expectations in the manner suggested does
not unduly limit Parliamentary sovereignty, and will not
result in a wholesale constitutional entrenchment of
property rights.
I1 est g6nmralement admis que le parlement a l'autorit6
absolue d'adopter des lois afin de r6silier des contrats
et de nier toute forme de compensation aux personnes
affectees par cette rdsiliation. Dans cet essai, l'auteur
conteste cette presomption. En effet, l'auteur soutient
que le principe de la primaut6 du droit pr6suppose que
les gouvemements sont redevables pour les actes poses
par leurs fonctionnaires. Ce principe serait an6anti si
le gouvemement pouvait limiter sa responsabilit6 suite
A la rupture d'un contrat valide. Ainsi, une loi dont le
but est de r~silier un contrat et de nier toute
compensation est invalide parce qu'elleviole les limites
a l'autorit6 parlementaire associ~es au principe de la
primaut6 du droit. De plus, l'auteur soutient que cette
protection des obligations contractuelles n'enfreint pas
]a souverainet6 parlementaire et que celle-ci ne
r~sultera pas en un empi~tement constitutionnel sur les
droits relatifs & ]a propri~t6.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Can the Canadian government repudiate a fairly bargained
contract and deny access to the courts for compensation? Until recently,
the answer to that question appeared relatively straightforward: there is
no Crown immunity from the law of contracts and the Crown is generally
bound by its contracts in the same manner as a private citizen.1 But this
general rule in favour of Crown liability is usually said to be subject to
being displaced through legislation. Courts will interpret any legislation
that expropriates rights strictly and will resolve ambiguities in favour of
the person whose rights are being affected? But assuming that the
statutory intention to expropriate contractual rights is expressed clearly
and unambiguously, the courts will give effect to the terms of the statute.
This doctrine has been summarized in the pithy statement of one
Ontario judge early in the twentieth century: "[tlhe prohibition '[t]hou
shalt not steal', has no legal force upon the sovereign body."3
1 See Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Liability of the Crown (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1989) c. 3. Note, however, the power of the Crown to repudiate or to deny the
validity of contracts that fetter some important executive power-the shadowy "executive necessity"
doctrine recognized in TheAmphitrite, [1921] 3 KB. 500 as a defence to a breach of contract. For a
criticism of this "intolerably vague" doctrine, see P.W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1989) at 171-72.
2 See generally, G.S. Challies, The Law of Expropriation (Montreal: Wilson and Lafleur, 1963)
at 12.
3 See Florence Mining Co. v. Cobalt Lake Mining Co. (1909), 18 O.L.R. 275 at 279 (C.A.).
[VOL. 33 NO. 3
Pearson Airport Legislation
While it has long been assumed that Parliament can shield the
Crown from claims for breach of contract, there is a surprising lack of
judicial authority directly on point. This is because the Parliament of
Canada, in contrast to a number of provincial legislatures, has very
rarely resorted to legislation in order to rewrite contracts in its favour.
4
Thus, while numerous judges and text writers have often affirmed that
Parliament can nullify contracts and deny compensation, such
statements have almost never been accompanied by any detailed analysis
of the issue, since the context did not appear to demand it.5
Despite the paucity of judicial authority directly on point, no
legal commentators have ever expressed any doubts about Parliament's
unlimited authority to deny compensation for breaches of contract.
Legislating away private rights may be manifestly unjust but, it is often
said, it is not for the courts to assess the wisdom of Parliament's
enactments. Thus, when the government of Canada introduced
legislation in early 1994 purporting to cancel a series of contracts for the
redevelopment of Pearson International Airport (the "Airport
Contracts"), the Minister of Justice confidently asserted that the
legislation, known as Bill C-22,6 was perfectly valid and constitutional.
Bill C-22, as passed by the House of Commons in June 1994, was
virtually unprecedented at the federal level in Canada.7 It provided that
a series of contracts entered into by the Crown "are hereby declared not
to have come into force and to have no legal effect;" 8 that "no action or
other proceeding ... lies or may be instituted by anyone against Her
4 The record at the provincial level is quite different, as there have been a significant number
of provincial statutes enacted over the years purporting to nullify contracts. These cases are
discussed in detail under Part IV(B)(1), below.
5 Most courts simply assume, without any discussion, that Parliament or the provincial
legislatures can rewrite contract terms and deny compensation. See, for example, the comments by
McIntyre J. in Re Upper Churchill Water Rights ReversionAct, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297 at 327 [hereinafter
Upper Churchill Water]: "no quarrel was made with the proposition that the Legislature of
Newfoundland is fully competent to expropriate property within its boundaries." Similarly, text
writers who discuss the issue treat it as a straightforward matter, not requiring any extensive
discussion. For example, Hogg devotes a short paragraph to the issue in his book-length study of
Crown liability: see supra note 1 at 172.
6 See An Act respecting certain agreements concerning the redevelopment and operation of
Terminals I and 2 at Lester B. Pearson International Airport, 1st Sess., 35th Par., 1994 [hereinafter
Bill C-22].
7 The only instance of federal legislation comparable to Bill C-22 is found in the regulations
enacted in 1942 under the War Measures Act, which authorized expropriating property and
contractual rights from Japanese Canadians: see "Order in Council establishing regulations
respecting the British Columbia Security Commission," P.C. 1665, 11 March 1942.
8 Bill C-22,supra note 6, cl. 3.
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Majesty ... for anything done ... in the performance of any ... duties;" 9
and that "no one is entitled to any compensation from Her Majesty in
connection with the coming into force of this Act."10
Despite the exceptional nature of these provisions, Justice
Minister Allan Rock told the Senate Committee examining the
legislation that "there was no question" as to Parliament's ability to
enact the billi l Mr. Rock stated that the only issue in terms of the bill's
legal effectiveness was whether Parliament had been clear in its
intention to exclude any right to compensation. Mr. Rock asserted that
Bill C-22 was perfectly clear in this regard and therefore, once enacted,
it would effectively nullify the Airport Contracts.
Given that Mr. Rock was expressing the consensus view on this
issue, one might have expected legal experts to line up in support of his
conclusions. In fact, precisely the opposite occurred. The Senate
Committee called upon a number of legal experts to opine on the
constitutional validity of Bill C-22 and, while opinion was somewhat
divided, the majority stated that Bill C-22 was unconstitutional.12 The
reason? According to a number of these experts, Bill C-22 violated the
rule of law-a basic principle of the Constitution-and was, on that
account, invalid.
This testimony caused the Senate to propose amendments
permitting access to the courts for purposes of obtaining compensation
for the government's cancellation of the Airport Contracts. While the
government rejected the arguments against the constitutional validity of
the Bill, it did eventually produce amendments of its own designed to
permit a limited right to claim compensation for out-of-pocket
expenses. 13 But even with these amendments, the Bill remained
9 Ibid., cl. 7.
10 Ibid., cl. 9.
1 1 See Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and ConstitutionalAffairs, No. 10
(4 July 1994) at 7 [hereinafter Senate Committee on Legal and ConstitutionalAffairs].
12 See, for example, Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, ibid.: the testimony
of D. Gibson and D. Schmeiser, No. 11 (5 July 1994); K. Norman, No. 14 (17 November 1994); and
0. Chipeur, No. 16 (1 December 1994). There were also views supporting the validity of the
legislation: see the testimony of W.A. Mackay, No. 12 (27 October 1994).
13 While the government initially rejected the Senate amendments and caused the House of
Commons to repass Bill C-22 in its original form, by the end of 1994 it had come forward with a set
of amendments of its own permitting very limited recourse to the courts for purposes of claiming
out of pocket expenses only. In May 1995, the government modified these proposed amendments
very slightly, claiming that the revisions would permit slightly broader access to the courts for
compensation: see Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, ibid., No. 2 (13 December
1994), and No. 33 (16 May 1995).
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controversial. A Senate committee subsequently held hearings into and
reported on the circumstances surrounding the government's
cancellation of the Airport Contracts, concluding that the decision to
cancel was wholly unsubstantiated. 14 In May 1996, the government
announced a further series of amendments aimed at responding to the
constitutional concerns that had been raised.15 Unexpectedly, on 19
June 1996, the amended version of the Bill was defeated by the Senate
on a vote of 48-48. Despite the fact that the legislation was not enacted,
the legal issues raised are of continuing importance.
I was one of those who testified before the Senate Committee on
the constitutional validity of Bill C-22. While I told the committee that I
believed the legislation was invalid, I reached this conclusion based on
relatively narrow grounds relating to the Canadian Bill of Rights,1 6 rather
than on the broader basis of the "rule of law."17 Indeed, I endorsed Mr.
Rock's argument to the effect that the principle of the rule of law does
not prevent Parliament from expropriating contractual rights and
denying claims for compensation. I therefore agreed that it would be
open to Parliament to deny all claims for compensation, provided that
the legislative intention was clearly expressed.
While I continue to believe that Bill C-22, as originally proposed
by the government, would have been found to be invalid, I have now
concluded that the assumption with which I began-namely, that the
rule of law does not constrain the ability of Parliament to expropriate
contractual rights and deny compensation-is very probably mistaken. I
now believe that the rule of law does limit Parliament's power to
expropriate contractual rights, and that the original version of Bill C-22
violated that principle. This article is an attempt to explain how I have
arrived at this conclusion.
The first section of the article examines a key threshold question:
does the rule of law limit Parliament's power to pass legislation, or does
it merely require that the government abide by whatever legislation
14 See Report of the Special Senate Committee on the Pearson Airport Agreements (December
1995) at xi-xiii [hereinafter Senate Committee on the Pearson AirportAgreements].
15 The legislation was reintroduced by the government as Bill C-28, An Act respecting certain
agreements concerning the redevelopment and operation of Terminals I and 2 at Lester B. Pearson
IntemationalAirport, 2d Sess., 35th Parl., 1996.
16 S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. III [hereinafter Bill of Rights].
1 7 My argument, essentially, was that the procedure for claiming compensation in Bill C-22
was flawed in that it authorized the Minister of Transport to determine the amount of
compensation, rather than an independent adjudicator. It therefore placed the Minister in the
position of being a judge in his own cause, and violated the guarantee in section 2(e) of the Bill of
Rights of an independent tribunal for the determination of one's rights and obligations.
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Parliament chooses to enact from time to time? I explain why-contrary
to the conventional wisdom, as well as to my own original views on this
question-I now believe that the rule of law binds Parliament as well as
the government. As such, the principle of the rule of law represents a
substantive limitation on Parliament's ability to pass laws, in addition to
the requirement that the government abide by whatever laws Parliament
may see fit to enact.
The second section of the paper examines the meaning and
content of the principle of the rule of law. I argue that the core meaning
of the rule of law is that governments are not above the law. This means
more than simply that governments must obey whatever laws happen to
be enacted by Parliament. It also embodies substantive limitations on
the laws that Parliament may enact. In order to comply with the
standards of the rule of law, legislation must not provide for the arbitrary
treatment of citizens by state officials.
The third section of the paper considers whether legislation
repudiating government liability for breach of contract is inconsistent
with the principle of the rule of law. I conclude that such legislation is
contrary to the rule of law since it permits government to absolve itself
from the consequences of its own wrongful acts. Such legislation
purports to place governments above the law, thus contradicting the
fundamental precept that governments should not be permitted to treat
citizens in an arbitrary manner.
The third section of the paper also examines the statements that
have been made by courts and other jurists to the effect that Parliament
may expropriate contractual rights and deny compensation, as long as
the expropriating statute is clear. I argue that, despite the frequency of
such statements, they have rarely been made in the context of a statute
which actually purported to nullify contractual rights. In fact, in cases
where statutes have purported to nullify contractual rights and deny
access to the courts for compensation, courts have usually found such
legislation to be unconstitutional. It is true that courts have arrived at
this conclusion for reasons other than the principle of the rule of law;
the most common basis for striking down statutes expropriating
contractual rights is that they are contrary to the federal division of
powers between Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
Nevertheless, while the reasoning in these cases does not endorse the
constitutional doctrine I propose, the results in the cases are largely
consistent with my analysis. In short, my claim-that the rule of law
requires government to honour its contractual commitments-could
actually be said to be immanent in the case law. This conclusion is more
than a little surprising (to say the least) given the widespread assumption
[VOL. 33 No. 3
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to the effect that Parliament has an unlimited power to expropriate
contractual rights and deny compensation.
I also consider whether my analysis is inconsistent with the fact
that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms18 does not contain any
guarantee for property rights. I explain why the protection of
contractual expectations is distinguishable from a more generalized
constitutional guarantee for property rights. As such, constitutional
protection for contractual expectations does not entail reading into the
constitution a guarantee for property rights, contrary to the intentions of
the drafters of the 1982 Constitution.
The final section of the paper examines the broader public policy
implications of the constitutional doctrine I propose. In recent years,
governments at both the federal and provincial levels in Canada have
rewritten the terms of contracts and denied recourse to the courts for
persons whose rights have been affected. Such attempts at contract
repudiation are, in many cases, a response to the fiscal crisis facing the
Canadian state, as governments intent on "downsizing" seek to renege
on prior commitments with a minimum of cost to the taxpayer. Given
the fact that such fiscal difficulties can be expected to persist and deepen
in the years ahead, it can be expected that governments will continue to
find contract repudiation an attractive political expedient. Yet, if the
analysis set out in this paper is correct-namely, that government cannot
rewrite contracts in its favour without compensating those persons
affected-this option may no longer be available.
II. THE RULE OF LAW BINDS PARLIAMENTS AS WELL AS
GOVERNMENTS
A. The Traditional View
For many years, it has been accepted that the rule of law is a
basic principle of the Canadian constitutional order. The judgment of
Rand J. in Roncarelli v. Duplessis19 is the leading authority in this regard.
Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis had cancelled Frank Roncarelli's
liquor licence because Roncarelli had posted bonds for Jehovah's
Witnesses arrested for distributing literature in breach of municipal by-
18 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
19 [1959] S.C.R. 121 [hereinafter Roncarelli].
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laws. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the cancellation of the
appellant's liquor licence by Premier Duplessis amounted to a "gross
abuse of legal power expressly intended to punish [Roncarelli] for an act
wholly irrelevant to the statute, a punishment which inflicted on him, as
it was intended to do, the destruction of his economic life."' 20 Rand J.
stated that this abuse of power was wholly inconsistent with the rule of
law:
[I]n the presence of expanding administrative regulation of economic activities, such a
step and its consequences are to be suffered by the victim without recourse or remedy,
that an administration according to law is to be superseded by action dictated by and
according to the arbitrary likes, dislikes and irrelevant purposes of public officers acting
beyond their duty, would signalize the beginning of disintegration of the rule of law as a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure. An administration of licenses on
the highest level of fair and impartial treatment to all may be forced to follow the practice
of "first come, first served," which makes the strictest observance of equal responsibility
to all of even greater importance; at this stage of developing government it would be a
danger of high consequence to tolerate such a departure from good faith in executing the
legislative purpose.2 1
The language of Rand J. was broad and expansive, referring to
the need for the "administration of licenses on the highest level of fair
and impartial treatment to all," particularly given the "expanding
administrative regulation of economic activities."'2 2 Yet despite this
expansive language, most commentators regard the case as merely
standing for the proposition that governments do not possess inherent
powers. The statute in Roncarelli did not authorize the Premier to
cancel Roncarelli's liquor licence on account of offering assistance to
Jehovah's Witnesses, and Premier Duplessis's action was therefore
unlawful. Government officials must act in accordance with the law as
set down by the legislature and the courts. But, at least on this view,
Roncarelli says nothing about fettering the legislature's right to enact
legislation. Thus, while the rule of law stands for the principle of legal
validity-that every official act must be justified by law-it does not limit
the ability of Parliament to change the law at will.
This interpretation of the rule of law is certainly widely accepted
by courts and commentators. No less an authority than A.V. Dicey,
perhaps the leading proponent of the rule of law as a basic element of
the British constitutional tradition, assumed that the principle did not
constrain the sovereignty of Parliament. The sovereignty of
20 Ibid. at 141.
21 Ibid. at 142.
22 1bi
[VOL. 33 No. 3
Pearson Airport Legislation
Parliament-which Dicey characterized as "that absolute despotic
power"-meant, for him, that Parliament has the "right to make or
unmake any law whatever." 23 Dicey states explicitly that Parliament has
the power to interfere with private rights such as those of contract and
property. While such private rights are "in civilised states justly held
specially secure and sacred," Dicey leaves no doubt that Parliament has
the power to override them and that this is perfectly consistent with the
principle of the rule of law:
A ruler who might think nothing of overthrowing the constitution of his country, would in
all probability hesitate a long time before he touched the property or interfered with the
contracts of private persons. Parliament, however, habitually interferes, for the public
advantage, with private rights.2 4
A more recent illustration of this same reasoning can be found in
the submission to the Senate Committee examining Bill C-22 by Joel
Bakan and David Schneiderman. Bakan and Schneiderman assert that
"the rule of law cannot serve as a basis for holding that a law is of no
force and effect."25 They arrive at this conclusion based on a distinction
between a constitutional "principle" and a constitutional "provision."
The rule of law, Bakan and Schneiderman assert, is undoubtedly a
constitutionalprinciple, but it is not itself a constitutional provision. Only
violation of constitutional provisions can give rise to a finding that a
statute is invalid 6 The authors conclude that this analysis is consistent
with the cases that have discussed the principle of the rule of law: courts,
they claim, have never relied upon the principle of the rule of law "on its
own" to hold legislation invalid.2 7 Bakan and Schneiderman apply this
reasoning to Bill C-22 and conclude that there is no basis for suggesting
that Bill C-22 is invalid based on the principle of the rule of law:
On the basis of the legal framework established by these cases, the constitutional
principle of rule of law imposes only one constraint on Parliament in relation to Bill C-22:
namely, that Parliament act within its constitutionally prescribed powers; or, in other
words, that Bill C-22 be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution. Bill C-22 is
valid unless it violates a provision of the Constitution. The rule of law is not a provision
23 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 10th ed. (London:
Macmillan, 1965) at 40.
2 4 ibid. at 48-49.
25 See J. Bakan & S. Schneiderman, "Submission to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal
and Constitutional Affairs Concerning Bill C-22" at 2 [unpublished].
26 The authors base this conclusion on the statement in section 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982,supra note 18, that "any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is ... of
no force and effect." See Bakan & Schneiderman, supra note 25 at 2 [emphasis in original].
2 7 1bid. at 3.
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of the Constitution, and nor has it ever been treated as such by the Supreme Court of
Canada28
If this analysis is correct, it yields results that may seem rather
surprising. For example, in the Roncarelli case, the Premier of Quebec
could have simply caused the legislature to grant him the statutory
power to cancel liquor licences for any reason whatsoever. This would
have cured the specific legal defect found by Rand J., namely, that the
Premier had acted beyond the specific powers conferred upon him by
the legislature. As amended, the statute would have granted the
Premier unlimited power to cancel liquor licences. 29 Therefore, he
would have been within his rights to cancel Roncarelli's liquor license
because he was offering financial assistance to Jehovah's Witnesses.
Would such an amended statute have passed constitutional muster?
On the Bakan-Schneiderman theory outlined above, the answer
presumably would have to be "yes." The question, however, is whether
this traditional assumption as to the limited ambit of the rule of law
would be accepted by a contemporary Canadian court. The recent
Supreme Court of Canada case-law on the rule of law has suggested that
this principle is not satisfied merely by requiring the government to
abide by whatever laws Parliament sees fit to enact. Rather, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the rule of law binds Parliament as
well as the government, and that the principle can be used to rule
legislation unconstitutional.
B. The Rule of Law as an Implied Limitation on Parliament
If we turn to the Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on the
rule of law, the first point that jumps out from the cases is their recent
vintage: almost all of the major Supreme Court cases on point were
decided in the past decade. The principle of the rule of law is certainly
28ThiML at 4 [emphasis in original].
29 Of course, courts are notoriously reluctant to interpret any grant of statutory power as
conferring unlimited discretion. As Rand J. observed in Roncarei, supra note 19 at 140: "[i]n public
regulation of this sort there is no such thing as absolute or untrammelled 'discretion,' that is that
action can be taken on any ground or for any reason that can be suggested to the mind of the
administrator." However, Rand J. immediately qualifies this statement when he completes the
sentence as follows: "no legislative Act can, without express language, be taken to contemplate an
unlimited arbitrary power exercisable for any purpose, however capricious or irrelevant, regardless
of the nature or purpose of the statute" [emphasis added]. The "without express language" qualifier
suggests that, if the legislature truly wishes to confer unlimited discretion on an official, the courts
will give effect to such intention as long as it is reflection in "express language."
[VOL. 33 No. 3
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far from novel. As noted above, the rule of law principle in Anglo-
Canadian law is usually traced back to the writings of Dicey more than a
century ago. 30 Yet, despite the long-standing character of the principle,
the Supreme Court of Canada had almost never relied upon the rule of
law as a ground of decision in a constitutional case prior to 1985.
That has changed quite dramatically in the past decade. Since
1985, the Supreme Court of Canada has based a number of path-
breaking constitutional decisions on the rule of law principle. What is
significant is not just the increasing frequency with which the rule of law
is being referred to, but the language used by Court to describe the
principle. The Court has stated that the rule of law is a fundamental
principle which underlies the whole of the Constitution. It has described
the rule of law as an implied limitation that must be read into all
provisions of the Constitution-including the provisions conferring
jurisdiction on Parliament and the provincial legislatures.
In short, my claim is that 1985 marks a key watershed in the
Supreme Court's approach to the rule of law. Since 1985, the Supreme
Court has clearly rejected the suggestion that the rule of law binds
governments, but not legislatures. The Court's recent cases have clearly
established that all constitutional powers, including the powers of
Parliament itself, are subject to the requirements of the rule of law.
1. The New Approach Emerges
The first case to signal the Supreme Court's new approach to the
rule of law is Reference Re Manitoba Language Rights.31 A unanimous
Supreme Court described the constitutional status of the rule of law as
follows:
[t]he Constitution Act, 1982 ... is explicit recognition that "the rule of law [is] a
fundamental postulate of our constitutional structure." The rule of law has always been
understood as the very basis of the English Constitution characterising the political
institutions of England from the time of the Norman Conquest. It becomes a postulate
of our own constitutional order by way of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1982 and
its implicit inclusion in the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867 by virtue of the words
"with a Constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom."
Additional to the inclusion of the rule of law in the preamble of the Constitution Acts of
1867 and 1982, the principle is clearly implicit in the very nature of a Constitution. The
Constitution, as the Supreme Law, must be understood as a purposive ordering of social
relations providing a basis upon which an actual order of positive laws can be brought
3 0 Supra note 23.
31 [19851 1 S.C.R. 721 [hereinafter Manitoba Language Reference].
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into existence. The founders of this nation must have intended, as one of the basic
principles of nation building, that Canada be a society of legal order and normative
structure: one governed by the rule of law. While this is not set out in a specific provision,
the principle of the rule of law is clearly a principle of our Constitution.3 2
While the Court recognizes the principle of the rule of law as
being "implicit in the very nature of a Constitution," it also notes that
the rule of law is "not set out'in a specific constitutional provision."33
Does this mean, as Bakan and Schneiderman suggested, that the rule of
law cannot be used "on its own" as a basis for striking down legislation?
The Court provides a clear answer to this very question later in
its reasons in the Manitoba Language Reference. The Court notes that it
has "in the past inferred constitutional principles from the preambles to
the Constitution Acts and the general object and purpose of the
Constitution. '34 The Court then quotes the following passage from the
judgment of Martland and Ritchie JJ. in the Reference Re Resolution to
Amend the Constitution:
However, on occasions, this Court has had to consider issues for which the B.N.A. Act
offered no answer. In each case, this Court has denied the assertion of any power which
would offend against the basic principles of the Constitution.3 5
What is significant about this passage is the statement that "any
power"-including, presumably, the authority of Parliament and the
provincial legislatures-is subject to the basic principles of the
Constitution. In effect, what the Court is here saying is that the implied
principles of the Constitution are limits on the sovereignty of Parliament
and the provincial legislatures. The Court confirms that this is its
intended meaning by quoting the following passage from the judgment
of Martland and Ritchie JJ. in the Patriation Reference as correctly
describing the nature of these "basic principles" that are inferred from
the structure of the Constitution:
It may be noted that the above instances of judicially developed legal principles and
doctrines share several characteristics. First, none is to be found in express provisions of the
British North America Acts or other constitutional enactments. Second, all have been
perceived to represent constitutional requirements that are derived from the federal
character of Canada's Constitution. Third, they have been accorded full legal force in the
sense of being employed to strike down legislative enactments. Fourth, each was judicially
developed in response to a particular legislative initiative in respect of which it might
32 lbid. at 750-51 [citations omitted; emphasis added].
33 Ibid.
3 4 lbid. at 751.
35 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 at 851 [hereinafter Patriation Reference; emphasis added].
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have been observed ... that "There are no Canadian constitutional law precedents
addressed directly to the present issue."3 6
Notice that the Court here is concerned with the same
distinction made by Bakan and Schneiderman between constitutional
"provisions" and constitutional "principles." In fact, the Court
emphasizes the sentence from the Martland-Ritchie judgment which
points out that constitutional principles such as the rule of law are not
found in "express provisions" of the constitution. Nonetheless, the
Court affirms, these "principles" have been accorded "full legal force in
the sense of being employed to strike down legislative enactments."37
It is true that in Manitoba Language Reference, the Supreme
Court of Canada utilized the principle of the rule of law to uphold
legislation, rather than to strike it down. 38 But the above passage leaves
little doubt that, in an appropriate case, the principle of the rule of law
could be used to invalidate legislation. In short, the Manitoba Language
Reference makes it plain that the rule of law binds legislative as well as
executive powers; all constitutional authority is subject to the implied
limitation that it must be exercised in a manner consistent with the rule
of law.
The Court reaffirmed this conclusion two years later in oPsEU v.
Ontario (A.G.),39 a case involving a challenge to Ontario legislation
restricting the political activities of civil servants in Ontario. One of the
arguments raised by the appellants was that the restrictions were
unconstitutional since they violated certain "unwritten guarantees" of
freedom of expression. Although the Court upheld the legislation, the
majority accepted the proposition that the Constitution Act, 186740
contemplates certain implied limitations on legislative power. The
majority opinion by Beetz J. described these implied limitations in the
following terms:
There is no doubt in my mind that the basic structure of our Constitution, as established
by the Constitution Act, 1867, contemplates the existence of certain political institutions,
36 Manitoba Language Reference, supra note 31 at 752 [citations omitted; emphasis in original].
3 7 1bid.
38 The Court held that immediately invalidating all the Acts of the Legislature of Manitoba
would have produced a situation of legal chaos, and destroyed the positive legal order of the
province. This, the Court concluded, would have undermined the principle of the rule of law.
Therefore, the Court declared that all provincial legislation would remain temporarily in effect,
notwithstanding the fact that it had not been translated into French as required by the Manitoba
Act, 1870, R.S.C. 1970, App. If.
39 [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2 [hereinafter oPsEU].
40 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
1995]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
including freely elected legislative bodies at the federal and provincial levels. In the
words of Duff C.J. in Reference reAlberta Statutes ... "such institutions derive their efficacy
from the free public discussion of affairs" and, in those of Abbott J. in Switzman v. Elbling
... neither a provincial legislature nor Parliament itself can "abrogate this right of
discussion and debate." Speaking more generally, I hold that neither Parliament nor the
provincial legislatures may enact legislation the effect of which would be to substantially
interfere with the operation of this basic constitutional structure.4 1
In the next paragraph, Beetz J. affirms that the basic structure of
the Constitution represents an implied limitation on Parliament's
authority:
I should perhaps add that issues like the last will in the future ordinarily arise for
consideration in relation to the political rights guaranteed under the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, which, of course, gives broader protection to these rights and
freedoms than is called for by the structural demands of the Constitution. However, it
remains true that, quite apart from Charter considerations, the legislative bodies in this
country must conform to these basic structural imperatives and can in no way ovenide
them.42
It is true that Beetz J. did not make reference in oPsEu to the
principle of the rule of law. But there can be little doubt, given the
Court's statement in the Manitoba Language Reference to the effect that
"the constitutional status of the rule of law is beyond question," that the
rule of law also qualifies as one of the "basic structural imperatives" of
the Canadian Constitution. Therefore, to paraphrase Beetz J.'s
statement in OPSEU, the legislative bodies in this country must conform to
the rule of law and can in no way override it.
2. The Rule of Law as a Guarantee of Access to Courts
The next case of significance in terms of the principle of the rule
of law is The British Columbia Government Employees Union v. B.C.
(A.G.)43 This case did not deal with the validity of a statute, but rather
with the attempts of a striking trade union to block physical access to the
courts. Nevertheless, former Chief Justice Dickson's judgment is helpful
for the comments he made on the importance of preserving access to the
courts. Dickson C.J. noted that certain sections of the Charter, including
41 oPsEU, supra note 39 at 57 [emphasis added; citations omitted].
42 1bid- [emphasis added]. Similar references to certain "implied limitations" derived from the
structure of the Canadian Constitution can be found in Fraser v. Public Service StaffRelations Board,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 455 at 462-63; RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 at 584; and New
Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. N.S., [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 at 375-78.
43 [1988] 2 S.C.R. 214 [hereinafter ECGEU #1].
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the preamble, section 52, and section 24, "are a complete answer to
anyone seeking to delay or deny or hinder access to the courts of justice
in this country." 44 He continued as follows:
The rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter and the courts are directed to
provide a remedy in the event of infringement. To paraphrase the European Court of
Human Rights in Golder v. United Kingdom ... it would be inconceivable that Parliament
and the provinces should describe in such detail the rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Charter and should not first protect that which alone makes it in fact possible to
benefit from such guarantees, that is, access to a court. As the Court of Human Rights
truly stated: "The fair, public and expeditious characteristics of judicial proceedings are
of no value at all if there are no judicial proceedings." 45
Dickson C.J. also adopted the following passage from the
judgment of the British Columbia Court of Appeal below:
We have no doubt that the right to access to the courts is under the rule of law one of the
foundational pillars protecting the rights and freedoms of our citizens. It is the
preservation of that right with which we are concerned in this case. Any action that
interferes with such access by any person or groups of persons will rally the court's
powers to ensure the citizen of his or her day in court. Here, the action causing the
interference happens to be picketing. As we have already indicated, interference from
whatever source falls into the same category.46
It might be argued that these broad statements should be limited
to the facts of the particular case-namely, situations in which private
persons attempt to hinder physical access to the courts. But the quoted
passage from the Court of Appeal speaks of "interference from whatever
source."' 47 There does not appear to-be any principled distinction
between physical and non-physical interference with court access, since
the ultimate effect on the individual is the same. Nor, in my view, is
there any principled basis for suggesting that the prohibition on limiting
court access applies only to private persons and not the legislature. In
fact, earlier in its judgment the British Columbia Court of Appeal had
specifically drawn attention to a passage in the judgment of the trial
judge in the case dealing with this very point:
It would be a monstrous situation, indeed, if a citizen were forced to delay or lose his
Charter rights due to picketing or any other interference with his or her access to the
courts. The maxim "justice delayed is justice denied" is apposite here. The court's
jurisdiction to deal with such interference quickly and resolutely is both necessary to
4 4 Ibid. at 228.
45 Ibid. at 229 [citations omitted].
46 Ibid. at 230, quoting from (1985), 20 D.L.R. (4th) 399 at 406 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter
B.CG.E.U. #2; emphasis added].
4 7 1bid.
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protect the citizen and the rule of law. We wish to emphasize the words Chief Justice
McEachern used when he granted the injunction:
I doubt if [even] the Legislature has the capacity to deprive a superior court of its
jurisdiction to protect itself and the public against criminal contempt. I also
question whether such an unthinkable purpose could be accomplished without a
constitutional amendment. As long as there are superior court judges then it seems
arguable that they must, by definition, have and continue to enjoy the inherent
power to protect their authority against criminal contempt.
(Our emphasis). 48
While Dickson C.J. did not specifically draw attention to this
passage, he did adopt the Court of Appeal's statement to the effect that
interference with court access "from whatever source" is contrary to the
rule of law. This additional passage from the Court of Appeal's
judgment makes plain that the Court of Appeal intended this limitation
to encompass attempts to limit court access by the legislature as well as
by private persons.
It might also be argued that Dickson C.J.'s comments only apply
in situations where there has been an infringement of a specific Charter
right. The former Chief Justice refers at a number of points to the fact
that access to the courts is required in order to vindicate Charter rights.
Thus, it might be argued, restricting access to the courts on non-Charter
or non-constitutional issues does not infringe the rule of law.
While it is true that Dickson C.J. refers frequently in his
judgment to the vindication of Charter rights, it would appear to be no
less offensive to the rule of law to deny court access for non-Charter
matters. In fact, the British Columbia Court of Appeal framed the issue
as one involving the jurisdiction of the courts generally:
[Tihe real issue before us is whether in a democratic society any person or bodies of
persons can restrict the rights of its citizens to enjoy the benefits of the rule of law under
the protection of an independent judiciary. 4 9
The Court of Appeal noted that the independence of the
judiciary had been guaranteed in England for close to three centuries:
It must be noted at the outset that judicial independence was won in England after
centuries of struggle with the executive and legislative branches of government. It was
finally achieved in 1701 by the Act of Settlement ... when tenure for the judges was
established.
As Sir William Holdsworth, the distinguished British legal historian has said in A History
of English Law:
48 BCGEU #2, ibid. at 404-05.
49 Ibid. at 401.
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The judiciary has separate and autonomous power just as truly as the King or
Parliament; and in the exercise of these powers, its members are not more in
the position of servants than the King or Parliament in the exercise of their
powers .... The judges have powers of this nature because, being entrusted
with the maintenance of the Supremacy of law, they are and long have been
regarded as a separate and independent part of the constitution. 5 0
After drawing attention to the preamble of the Constitution Act,
1867, which provides that Canada is to have a Constitution "similar in
principle to that of the United Kingdom," the Court of Appeal noted:
In inheriting a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom we have
also inherited the fundamental precept that the courts represent a separate and
independent branch of government.5 1
What these passages indicate is that right of access to the courts
is in no way limited to the vindication of rights set out in the Charter.
Rather, the rule of law encompasses the right of citizens to a "separate
and independent branch of government"-the judiciary-for the
determination of rights and obligations. Therefore, to deprive citizens of
access to the courts for the determination of their rights, even if this is
accomplished through legislation, must be inconsistent with the rule of
law.
C. Explaining the Shift
In my view these recent cases leave little doubt that, in an
appropriate case, the rule of law can now be invoked to limit legislative
powers. The Court has explicitly rejected the notion that only
"provisions" of the Constitution can be used to strike down legislation
and comes down squarely in favour of the proposition that the rule of
law binds legislatures as well as governments.
How can we account for the Court's shift in attitude since 1985?
In part, the explanation may be attributable to the fact that the preamble
to the 1982 Constitution made explicit reference to the principle of the
rule of law. In the Manitoba Language Reference the Court noted the
reference to the rule of law in the preamble, even as it denied that the
preamble was the sole source of the constitutional significance of the
principle. Yet without this constitutional foothold, the Court would
presumably have had much more difficulty in according as much
significance as it has in recent years to the rule of law.
50 kid. [citations omitted].
51 Ibid at 402.
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At the same time, the emerging rule-of-law jurisprudence is part
of a larger trend of the Court, a trend which seeks to subject all political
and legislative choices to judicial review and oversight. The enactment
of the Charter has placed the Court in the position of second-guessing
the legislatures on a wide variety of policy matters that previously would
have been regarded as off-limits. This, in turn, has made the Court
much more comfortable with the notion of "unwritten" or "implied"
constitutional limitations on the authority of Parliament. The shift in
attitude is exemplified by comparing Beetz J.'s comments in the 1987
oPsEu case, with his 1978 decision in Canada (A.G.) and Dupond v.
Montreal.5 2 In Dupond, Beetz J. had poured cold water on the notion
that legislative powers were subject to "implied limitations," holding that
there is no implied guarantee that "is so enshrined in the Constitution as
to be above the reach of competent legislation."53 Less than a decade
later, the same judge affirmed that there are, indeed, certain "basic
structural imperatives" and that legislatures can "in no way override
them."5 4
The Court in the Charter era has clearly become an activist
Court, willing to review the wisdom of Parliament's legislative choices in
a wide variety of public policy fields. Nor is such heightened judicial
activism limited to Charter or constitutional cases. The operating
premise for the contemporary Court seems to be that there is no area of
state activity that is immune from judicial review and sanction.55
Whatever the explanation, the fact that there has been a shift in
the Court's approach to these questions is, in my view, unmistakable.
This leads immediately to a second question: what is the content and
meaning of the principle of the rule of law? To put this another way,
assuming that the rule of law binds Parliament, how do we know when
legislation offends the principle such that it should be ruled invalid?
Since the Court has not yet relied upon the rule of law as a basis
for striking down legislation, the answer to this question must necessarily
be somewhat tentative. Yet, the Court's analysis of the principle in its
recent cases does give us a number of important road marks in sketching
out the answer.
52 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770 [hereinafter Dupond].
53 Ibid. at 796.
5 4 OPSEU, supra note 39 at 57.
55 Examples of this phenomenon in the non-constitutional context include Nelles v. R., [1989]
2 S.C.R. 170 and Carey v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 637; in both instances the court abolished common law
doctrines which had granted unreviewable discretion to Crown officials.
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III. THE RULE OF LAW AS A LIMIT ON ARBITRARY
GOVERNMENT
There have certainly been a wide variety of meanings associated
with the term "rule of law." As McLachlin J. of the Supreme Court of
Canada suggested in a 1991 lecture, "the term 'Rule of Law' means
many things to many people."56 Despite such differences, I would
suggest that the leading judicial and academic authorities on the rule of
law subscribe to a common idea of the meaning of the principle. This
core meaning is simply that the rule of law requires that individuals be
protected from arbitrary government. E.C.S. Wade summarized this
common understanding of the concept of the rule of law in his
"Introduction" to Dicey's Introduction to the Study of the Law of the
Constitution:
The rule of law presupposes the absence of arbitrary power and so gives the assurance
that the individual can ascertain with reasonable certainty what legal powers are available
to government if there is a proposal to affect his private rights. A person who takes the
trouble to consult his lawyer ought to be able to ascertain the legal consequences of his
own acts and what are the powers of others to interfere with those acts.
57
Many other statements to the same effect could be cited.58 The
Supreme Court of Canada in the Manitoba Language Reference
suggested that the principle included at least two elements, the first of
which was described as follows:
First, that the law is supreme over officials of the government as well as private
individuals, and thereby preclusive of the influence of arbitrary power.59
Further elaboration of the meaning of the rule of law can be
found in the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Nova
Scotia Pharmaceutical Society.60 This case established the proposition
that laws that are so vague as to be "unintelligible" are contrary to the
56 "Rules and Discretion in the Governance of Canada" (1992) 56 Sask. L. Rev. 167 at 168.
57 Supra note 23 at cx-cxi.
5 8 See, for example, Dicey, ibid. at 193: "[w]ith us every official, from the Prime Minister down
to a constable or a collector of taxes, is under the same responsibility for every act done without
legal justification as any other citizen."
5 9 Supra, note 31 at 749. The second meaning of the rule of law was described as follows: "the
rule of law requires the creation and maintenance of an actual order of positive laws which
preserves and embodies the more general principle of the normative order. Law and order are
indispensable elements of civilized life": ibid.
60 [1992] 2 S.C.R. 606 [hereinafter Nova Scotia Pharmaceutical].
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"principles of fundamental justice," as guaranteed under section 7 of the
Charter.
The Supreme Court held that this "void for vagueness" doctrine
rested on two underlying rationales: fair notice to the citizen and the
limitation of law enforcement discretion. With respect to "fair notice to
the citizen," Gonthier J. noted that it had a substantive component,
"which could be described as a notice, an understanding that some
conduct comes under the law." 61 As for the limitation of law
enforcement discretion, Gonthier J. tied this to the idea that government
officials not be permitted to act arbitrarily: "[a] law must not be so
devoid of precision in its content that a conviction will automatically flow
from the decision to prosecute." 62 Gonthier J. linked these values to the
principle of the rule of law:
The two rationales of fair notice to the citizen and limitation of law enforcement
discretion have been adopted as the theoretical foundations of the doctrine of vagueness.
... These two rationales have been broadly linked with the corpus of principles of government
known as the "rule of law," which lies at the core of our political and constitutional
tradition.63
Later in his judgment, under the heading "Vagueness and the
Rule of Law," Gonthier J. again links the values of fair notice and
limitation of law enforcement discretion to the rule of law:
The criterion of absence of legal debate relates well to the rule of law principles that form
the backbone of our polity. Here one must see the rule of law in the contemporary
context. Continental European studies ... are relevant. ... J.-P. Henry ... gives the
following definition:
In theoretical terms, the ttat de droit is a system of organization in which all
social and political relations are subject to the law: This means that relations
between individuals and authority, as well as relations between individuals
themselves, are part of a legal interchange involving rights and obligations.64
Gonthier J. also states that his comments with respect to
vagueness are not limited to the criminal law context, but apply to all
enactments:
Finally, I also wish to point out that the standard I have outlined applies to all
enactments, irrespective of whether they are civil, criminal, administrative or other. The
61 Ibid. at 633-34.
62 Ibid. at 636.
63 Ibid. at 632 [emphasis added].
64 Ibid. at 640, citing J.-P. Henry, "Vers la fin de l'ttat de droit?" (1977), 93 Rev. dr. publ.
1207 at 1208 [translation].
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citizen is entitled to have the State abide by constitutional standards of precision
whenever it enacts legal dispositions. 65
He summarizes his analysis by once again linking the doctrine of
vagueness to the rule of law.
The doctrine of vagueness can therefore be summed up in this proposition: a law will be
found unconstitutionally vague if it so lacks in precision as not to give sufficient guidance
for legal debate. This statement of the doctrine best conforms to the dictates of the rule
of law in the modem State, and it reflects the prevailing argumentative, adversarial
framework for the administration of justice.66
The underlying concern of the Court in cases such as Nova Scotia
Pharmaceutical, Manitoba Language Reference, and BCGEU #1 is clear.
The rule of law limits the arbitrary exercise of power by state officials.
State officials must exercise their discretion in accordance with
standards that are meaningful and are identified in advance. Otherwise
the citizen is subject to decisions that are taken according to the shifting
whims of state officials, rather than in accordance with a regime based
on the rule of law.
As the Court in BCGEU #1 emphasized, one of the most
important ways that we prevent arbitrariness by government is through
guaranteeing access to the courts. The existence of an independent
judiciary, and guaranteed access to those courts by all citizens, is
indispensable to the rule of law. The abolition of the courts, directly or
indirectly, would make impossible a system of organization "in which all
social and political relations are subject to the law." 67
Therefore, the rule of law must impose some limits on the ability
of Parliament to prevent or abolish access to the courts for the purpose
of holding government accountable.
IV. CONTRACT REPUDIATION AS A VIOLATION OF THE
RULE OF LAW
A. First Principles
How does the analysis in the preceding two sections relate to the
subject with which we began, namely, the ability of the government to
repudiate contracts and deny claims for compensation?
65 Ibid. at 642.
66 Ibid. at 643 [citations omitted].
67 Henry, supra note 64 at 1208.
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The simple answer is that if the rule of law means anything, it
must prevent the Crown from entering into binding contracts and then,
for no good reason, rewriting the terms of the contract terms in its favour
without paying compensation. To permit the Crown to act in this
manner is to authorize decisions that are, by definition, arbitrary and
high-handed.
Now it might be observed that in cases of this kind it is
Parliament, and not the Crown, that is rewriting the terms of the
contract. That is, Parliament is exempting the Crown from its liability
for a contract through the enactment of a statute. Does the existence of
such a ratifying statute alter the conclusion that such a contract
repudiation is inherently arbitrary? In my view, the answer to this must
be "no." This is because the traditional doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty does not distinguish between cases in which there is some
legitimate public policy justification for the desire by the Crown to
escape from the contract, as opposed to those instances where the only
motivation is expediency. The traditional or orthodox position is that
Parliament may authorize the Crown to "skip out" on a contract for any
reason whatever. In effect, it is an assertion that the word of government
means nothing, that the state can solemnly promise something one day
and renege on that promise the next, without any legal consequences, as
long as such arbitrary action is ratified by statute. Because such a
doctrine flatly contradicts the whole notion of government according to
law, it must be contrary to the principle of the rule of law.
One possible escape from this conclusion is to suggest that there
are, indeed, limits on the ability of government to renege on contractual
commitments, but that these limits are political rather than legal or
constitutional. Governments, like everyone else, want to maintain their
reputation for keeping promises. A government that regularly breaks its
promises for no good reason will come to be regarded as untrustworthy
and eventually will discover that no one is willing to contract with it. The
need to appear trustworthy will thus operate as a significant political
constraint on officials contemplating contract repudiation for no
legitimate reason.
No doubt such political constraints are real and meaningful. But
the fact that the political system might provide some measure of
restraint on arbitrariness does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
the legal system should therefore provide none. This is because the
political constraints that exist are imperfect and uneven in application.
They depend upon the short-term calculus of political officials as to
whether the costs of contract repudiation outweigh the benefits.
Moreover, politicians (as opposed to judges) have a clear interest in the
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outcome, since the state stands to benefit financially if it successfully
"skips out" on the contract.
Not only are political constraints no substitute for judicial and
constitutional ones, political constraints are themselves impaired when
they are not supplemented by legally enforceable limitations on contract
repudiation. This is the finding from an authoritative comparative study
of the growth of public enterprise in Canada and the United States in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 68 This study, written
by economist James Baldwin for the Economic Council of Canada,
attempted to explain why Canada has chosen public enterprise as a
regulatory instrument more often than has the United States. What the
study discovered was that the greater reliance on public enterprise in
Canada could be traced to the fact that the Canadian legal system during
this period failed to prevent the state from confiscating property. When
the state acts unfairly and opportunistically, private firms tend to
withdraw from the field, forcing the state to step in through the creation
of public enterprise. Baldwin summarizes his argument as follows:
Where the government cannot be bound to abide by fairly written contracts, the cost of
its abrogating such contracts will be less. In certain situations, political pressures to
abrogate contracts without compensation will be too great for even fair-minded
politicians who are reasonably cognizant of the long-run consequences of their actions.
When this occurs, the regulatory process is more likely to fail and the contractual
problem will be "internalized" via the creation of public enterprise. These overriding
political pressures will not arise in every situation. When they do, they may be resisted.
But, over time, if constraints on the actions of the state do not emerge, the regulatory process
will gradually be supplanted by the creation of public enterprise in those sectors where the
contractual difficulties are greatest. 69
Baldwin suggests that judicially-imposed constraints on contract
repudiation, far from being inconsistent with purely political constraints,
are actually essential to the effective operation of the latter. In fact,
Baldwin argues that it was only because the Canadian legal system was
prepared to impose some limits on contract repudiation by
government-for example, by construing confiscatory legislation
narrowly-that the reliance on public enterprise did not become even
more widespread.
The fact that the state must stand behind its promises does not
necessarily mean that the government must perform a contract that it
determines not to be in the public interest. What it does mean is that, if
68 See J.R. Baldwin, Regulatory Failure and Renewal: The Evolution of the Natural Monopoly
Contract (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1989).
69 Ibid. at 4 [emphasis added].
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the government wishes to cancel or amend a contract, persons whose
rights have been affected must be permitted to seek redress through the
courts. It is the denial of court access, rather than the decision to
repudiate the contract, which is contrary to the rule of law. As the
Supreme Court of Canada stated in BCGEU #1, "the right to access to the
courts is under the rule of law one of the foundational pillars protecting
the rights and freedoms of our citizens." 70
Applying this analysis to the context of Bill C-22 would suggest
that the government was perfectly within its rights to decide not to
proceed with the Airport Contracts. Where it ran afoul of the rule of
law was in seeking to enact legislation to limit access to the courts for
redress by persons thereby affected. Such legislation would have had the
effect of placing the government above the law and undermined the
basic accountability that the rule of law requires.
I conclude that, in principle and apart from any pre-1985
Canadian judicial authority, the rule of law should operate to limit the
power of Parliament to bar access to the courts in the manner
contemplated by Bill C-22.
This brings me to consider the pre-1985 cage law, which asserts
that Parliament has an unlimited authority to repudiate contracts and
deny access to the courts for purposes of seeking compensation. Does
the existence of this case law preclude the conclusion that I propose?
B. The Contrary Case Law
The cases which seem to suggest that Parliament or the
provincial legislatures have an unlimited authority to deny access to the
courts for contract repudiation fall into three distinct categories.
The first is the cases dealing with contract repudiation by
provincial legislatures; the second is the cases dealing with legislative
power to expropriate property without the payment of compensation;
and the third is the cases which state that a doctrine of "legitimate
expectations" would be an unacceptable fetter on Parliament's
legislative powers. I will examine each of these groups of cases in turn
and suggest that, when examined closely, none of them represents an
obstacle to the conclusion I have thus far outlined.
7 0 Supra note 43 at 230.
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1. The Provincial Contract Repudiation Cases
I noted in the introduction to this paper that, since the federal
Parliament has rarely attempted to repudiate contracts and deny access
to the courts, there is no case law dealing directly with Parliament's
authority in this area. This is certainly not the case at the provincial
level, since a number of provinces have purported to rewrite contract
terms through legislation and deny court access for the persons whose
rights were being expropriated.
These attempts at contract repudiation have usually led to
litigation, and the courts have in many instances ruled the confiscatory
provincial statutes to be unconstitutional. But these results have usually
been based on division-of-powers considerations. The cases recite,
usually without any detailed analysis, the orthodox view that Parliament
or the legislatures can cancel any contract and deny compensation, as
long as the statute is clearly worded.
For example, in Upper Churchill Water,71 the Newfoundland
Legislature had enacted legislation purporting to cancel a contract for
the supply of power to Hydro-Quebec. While the Supreme Court of
Canada held that the legislation was ultra vires, it based its decision on
the fact that the statute was directed at contractual rights outside of the
province. It was simply assumed that a provincial legislature could
validly expropriate intra-provincial contractual rights. McIntyre J.,
writing for a unanimous Court, framed the issue in the following way:
One of the principal attacks made against the Reversion Act was that the Act interferes
with civil rights existing outside the Province of Newfoundland. While no quarrel was
made with the proposition that the Legislature of Newfoundland is fully competent to
expropriate property within its boundaries, it was argued that when the exercise of
expropriation powers derogates from civil rights outside the Province the enactment is
ultra vires.72
Since there was no argument on the point, McIntyre J. does not
cite any authority for the proposition that a province may nullify
contractual rights "in the province" and deny compensation to the
contracting parties. In fact, as I explain below, there is no case which has
ever upheld a provincial statute nullifying contractual rights and denying
compensation to the owner. The basis for the assumption seems to be
that, since the legislature may expropriate property and deny
compensation, it must also be able to abrogate contracts and deny
71 Supra note 5.
72 Ibid. at 327 [emphasis added].
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compensation. The only possible basis for impugning provincial
legislation abrogating contractual rights is if the legislation interferes
with contractual rights outside of the province.
The only difficulty with this way of approaching the issue is that a
number of older cases dealing with the right of a province to nullify
contractual rights do not seem entirely consistent with this theory. In a
number of these cases, the courts had struck down provincial legislation
interfering with contractual rights, even though the extra-provincial
elements of the contracts were relatively minor. Indeed, these older
cases had been criticized by Peter Hogg as taking "too narrow a view of
the territorial limitation on provincial legislative competence."73 Hogg
had singled out a number of cases for criticism, including Ottawa Valley
Power Co. v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission,7 4 and Royal Bank of
Canada v. R. 75 For example, Hogg's comments on the Ottawa Valley
case are as follows:
The contract had been made in Ontario. It required the company to deliver electric
power to the Commission at the boundary between Ontario and Quebec, and required
the Commission to pay the company in Toronto. But, despite these strong intraprovincial
elements, Middleton JA for the Ontario Court of Appeal said that the statute "affected"
rights outside Ontario, and was for this reason invalid. 76
Hogg favours the analysis in another case, Ladore v. Bennett,77 in
which a provincial statute which affected extra-provincial rights was
upheld.78 Hogg notes that under the "pith and substance" doctrine, a
provincial law that is primarily directed at a matter within provincial
jurisdiction can validly "affect" rights outside of the province. Hogg
argues that the cases such as Ottawa Valley and Royal Bank were wrongly
decided, since the provincial statutes in those cases were primarily
directed at contractual rights "in the province." If the province is able to
expropriate contract rights "in the province" and not pay compensation,
73 Ibi. at 331, McIntyre J., referring to P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1977) at 209-10.
74 [1937] O.R. 265 (C.A.) [hereinafter Ottawa Valley].
75 [1913] A.C. 283 (P.C.) [hereinafter Royal Bank].
76 Hogg, supra note 73 at 209.
77 [1939] A.C. 468 (P.C.) [hereinafter Ladore].
78 In Ladore, provincial legislation had amalgamated certain municipalities. In the course of
the amalgamation, the securities for the debts of the former municipalities were replaced by new
bonds issued by the new municipality. Although certain out-of-province creditors were affected by
the legislation, the Privy Council upheld it on the basis that its "pith and substance" was municipal
institutions in the Province. See further discussion infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.
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which everyone seems to assume it can, then the statutes at issue in
those cases should have been upheld.
In Upper Churchill Water, McIntyre J. refers to Hogg's criticism
of these earlier cases and notes the apparent conflict between Ladore
and cases such as Ottawa Valley and Royal Bank. McIntyre J. opines that
Ladore "states the law correctly" and that "where the pith and substance
of the provincial enactment is in relation to matters which fall within the
field of provincial legislative competence, incidental or consequential
effects on extra-provincial rights will not render the enactment ultra
vires."79 With respect to the Royal Bank case, McIntyre J. indicates that
"the factual basis for the ... case is not entirely clear from the report,"
and that "it must be assumed, however, that there was at least an implied
finding that the pith and substance of the Act in question was in relation
to extra-provincial rights if it is to be accepted today as authority. 80
Since this early line of cases represents the foundation for the
assumption that a province may nullify contracts "within the province,"
these cases bear close and careful scrutiny. As Hogg indicated, cases
such as Ottawa Valley and Royal Bank are difficult to justify on the basis
that there was an interference with contractual rights outside of the
province. In fact, an alternative and, in my view, more persuasive way of
accounting for the results in the cases is that there is an implied
limitation on provincial power to interfere with contractual rightsper se.
Consider, first, the Ottawa Valley case, involving contracts
between the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario and Ottawa
Valley Power Company, a Quebec company distributing power in
Quebec. The Ontario provincial government had passed Orders-in-
Council authorizing the Commission to enter into and perform the
contracts with Ottawa Valley. Some years later, the province enacted
the Power Commission Act, 1935, of which section 2 declared the
contracts "to be and always to have been illegal, void, and unenforceable
as against The Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario. /8 1
Section 3 of the same legislation provided as follows:
No action or other proceeding shall be brought, maintained or proceeded with against
the said Commission founded upon any contract by this Act declared to be void and
79 Upper Churchill Water, supra note 5 at 332.
80 Ibid.
81 S.O. 1935, c. 53.
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unenforceable, or arising out of the performance or non-performance of any of the terms
of the said contracts. 82
The Ontario Court of Appeal, by a majority of 3-2, held that
both sections 2 and 3 of this Act were ultra vires. The main argument
advanced by counsel for the plaintiffs was that the legislation dealt with
civil rights outside of the province and was for that reason ultra vires.83
The three separate majority opinions each accepted this argument, and
the case is usually cited for the proposition that a province may not
legislate so as to impair extra-provincial contractual rights.
In fact, however, two of the three judges who formed the
majority did not rely solely on the argument that the legislation impaired
extra-provincial contractual rights. These two judges each advanced
separate arguments which would have had the effect of limiting
provincial power to derogate from contractual rights in general.
Middleton J. arrived at this conclusion on the basis that any provincial
legislation which purports to "destroy a contract" necessarily impairs
rights outside of a single province:
A contract creates civil rights which, speaking generally, know no territorial limitation.
'When legislation does not merely prohibit resort to Provincial Courts but purports, as
here, to destroy the contract itself, that legislation does not concern "Civil Rights in the
Province," but is an attempt to destroy civil rights which have no territorial limitation,
and, in my view, it is ultra vires of the Province. A fortiori where the contract creates an
obligation to pay money outside of the Province, that cannot be described as a civil right
in the Province. 84
In short, what Middleton J.A. is suggesting is a general limitation
on provincial power to interfere with contractual rights, regardless of the
particular details of the contract in question. This is because, as he puts it,
contractual rights "know no territorial limitation." Thus any attempt by
the Province to nullify contractual rights would necessarily be beyond
provincial jurisdiction.
Fisher J.A., another member of the majority, concluded that the
legislation was invalid because it interfered with contractual rights
outside of the province. But he, too, advanced a broader argument to
justify the result in the case. This broader argument was that legislation
82 Ibid. A separate section of the same legislation (s. 6(4)) provided that "[w]ithout the
consent of the Attorney General, no action shall be brought against the Commission or against any
member thereof for anything done or omitted in the exercise of his office." The Attorney General
had declined to give consent to Ottawa Valley to sue the Commission. This section was also
attacked and the Court of Appeal ruled that it was invalid.
83 See Ottawa Valley, supra note 74 at 328.
8411d. at 304.
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which prohibits access to the Superior Courts is necessarily invalid, since
it derogates from an "implied guarantee" in the Constitution:
There is another ground upon which the validity of secs. 2 and 3 may be attacked. Those
sections, in fact, limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Ontario. The limitation
being a particular and not a general limitation does not make any difference. The
limitation is there and, whether particular or general, is nonetheless a limitation. Being a
limitation its effect is to take away from the Supreme Court one at least of the essential
characteristics of a Superior Court. The British North America Act does not, it is true,
guarantee the continued existence of the Superior Court in each of the Provinces. But it
is quite clear that both secs. 96 and 127[sic] are founded upon an unwritten guarantee of the
continuance of the Superior Courts in the Provinces. To alter the essential character of the
Supreme Court as a Superior Court in any vital particular, is contrary to the spirit of The.
British North America Act, and tantamount to an unauthorized repeal of that Statute in that
respect. To do so therefore is beyond the power of any Legislature which is the creature of
that Statute.8 5
This analysis-with its references to "unwritten guarantees" and
to the "spirit" of the British North America Act-is broadly similar to the
discussion of the Court in the Manitoba Language Reference respecting
the role played by certain "unwritten principles" of the Constitution,
including the rule of law. It also foreshadows the analysis and
conclusion of Dickson C.J. in BCGEU #1, to the effect that limitations on
access to the courts are unconstitutional. While Fisher J.A. does not
make any reference to the principle of the "rule of law," his concern is
precisely the same as that voiced by Dickson C.J. in BCGEU #1-namely,
that guaranteed access to the courts is an implied principle of the
Canadian Constitution.
What is particularly significant is that Fisher J.A. concludes that
even a "particular limitation" on the jurisdiction of the courts is
unconstitutional. In other words, it is not necessary to totally bar access
to the courts in order to violate the unwritten guarantees of court access.
Even a particular limitation, barring proceedings based on particular
contracts, is "contrary to the spirit of the British North America Act, and
tantamount to a repeal of that Statute in that respect."8 6 This reasoning
is, of course, relevant to Bill C-22, since the "no proceedings" clause in
the Bill bars access to the courts only for particular kinds of actions. The
reasoning of Fisher J.A. in the Ottawa Valley case would suggest that
even this "particular limitation" offends the principle of the rule of law.
What of the Privy Council decision in Ladore,8 7 a case in which
legislation rewriting contract terms was upheld, and which McIntyre J.,
8 5 ]bid. at 333 [emphasis added].
86 bpU
8 7 Supra, note 77.
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in Upper Churchill Water, says "states the law correctly?" 88 While it is
true that, in Ladore, legislation which affected contractual rights was
upheld, close analysis of the case indicates that it does not support an
untrammelled provincial authority to nullify contractual rights.
Ladore concerned the validity of provincial legislation which
amalgamated certain municipalities in Ontario into the City of Windsor.
In the process of amalgamation, the securities for the debts of the
various component municipalities were replaced by new bonds issued by
the new City of Windsor with modifications in interest rates and other
terms of the indebtedness.
The critical point to note about this process of debt adjustment,
however, is that it was undertaken pursuant to a statute of general
application, with creditors having extensive rights to participate in and
approve any arrangement. The debt adjustment was undertaken
pursuant to Part III of the Department of Municipal Affairs Act, 1935.89
Under this statute, the Ontario Municipal Board had to first be satisfied
that a municipality had, inter alia, "failed to meet and pay any of its
debentures or interest thereon" or "become so financially involved or
embarrassed that default in meeting any of its obligations may probably
ensue. ' 90 If, "upon inquiry," the Board is satisfied that any of these
conditions is satisfied, it may vest control over the municipality in the
Department of Municipal Affairs and declare that the municipality is
subject to the provisions of Part III of the legislation, entitled "Special
Jurisdiction Over Defaulting Municipalities." 91 A notice to this effect is
to be published in the Ontario Gazette, such publication to act as a stay
of all actions and proceedings pending against the municipality. 92 The
Board is given special powers to consolidate or reorganize the
indebtedness of the municipality. However, before any such
reorganization is effected, notice of the proposed order must be
published in the Ontario Gazette at least three months in advance.93 If
creditors representing not less than one-third of the aggregate
indebtedness of the municipality object in writing, no such order
compromising debt is to be issued.
88 Upper Churchill Water, supra note 5 at 332.
89 S.O. 1935, c. 16.
90 Ibid., ss. 25(1)(a) and (c).
91 Ibid, s. 26(1).
92lbid., ss. 29 and 30.
93 Ibid, s. 35.
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The point of reviewing the details of the legislation is to indicate
that it established a standard scheme for debt adjustment, designed to
protect the interests of both the municipalities and the creditors. The
scheme was in no way inconsistent with rule of law principles, since it did
not contemplate or authorize arbitrary actions by government. Indeed,
the legislation here can be contrasted with that in the Ottawa Valley case,
in which the Ontario government had specifically approved a particular
contract, but then sought to enact legislation stating that the contract
was absolutely void. In Ottawa Valley, unlike Ladore, the government
was acting in a high-handed and arbitrary manner since it was
unilaterally attempting to deny all rights, rather than attempting to reach
a consensual accommodation with the persons whose rights were being
affected.
In terms of the facts that gave rise to the litigation in Ladore, the
municipalities in the Windsor area had defaulted on a number of
debentures and, by 1934, "something like a total default was
threatened." 94 The statutory procedure was followed and the majority
of the creditors approved of the debt adjustment proposal, which
provided that former creditors should receive debentures of the new city
of equal nominal amount to those formerly held, but the interest was
scaled down in various classes of debentures. The plaintiffs were four
ratepayers and debenture holders who were unhappy with the proposed
arrangement. They sought a declaration that the legislation under which
it had been effected was invalid since it interfered with extra-provincial
contractual rights.
The action was dismissed both at trial and by the Ontario Court
of Appeal. 95 The Privy Council dismissed the appeal, rejecting the
argument that the legislation was a colourable device to interfere with
the rights of creditors outside of Ontario. Lord Atkin noted that it was
imperative that the province have the power to deal with the situation of
local governments that have become "ineffective or non-existent because
of the financial difficulties of one or more municipal institutions. ''96 He
continued:
[w]here the former bodies are dissolved it is inevitable that the old debts disappear, to be
replaced by new obligations of the new body. And in creating the new corporation with the
powers of assuming new obligations it is implicit in the powers of the Legislature
9 4 Supra note 77 at 481.
95 [1938] O.R. 324 (C.A.).
9 6 Ibid. at 481.
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(sovereign in this respect) that it should place restrictions and qualifications on the
obligations to be assumed.9 7
While Lord Atkin states that the legislature is "sovereign in this
respect," note that this statement is premised on the fact that the old
debts are "to be replaced by new obligations of the new body."' 98 In
short, the reference to the sovereignty of the legislature cannot be
interpreted as conferring absolute authority to simply cancel creditors'
rights and preclude their access to the courts absent their consent.
Lord Atkin then deals with the argument that the legislation
interferes with the rights of creditors outside the province:
It was suggested in argument that the impugned provisions should be declared invalid
because they sought to do indirectly what could not be done directly-namely, to
facilitate repudiation by Provincial municipalities of obligations incurred outside the
Province. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said many times by the Courts in
Canada and by the Board, that the Courts will be careful to detect and invalidate any
actual violation of constitutional restrictions under pretence of keeping within the
statutory field. A colourable device will not avail. But in the present case nothing has
emerged even to suggest that the Legislature of Ontario at the respective dates had any
purpose in view other than to legislate in times of difficulty in relation to the class of
subject which was its special care-namely, municipal institutions.99
The implication from this passage is that, had the province been
attempting merely to facilitate repudiation of municipal debts, the
legislation might well have been held to be invalid. The invalidity would
have been based on the theory that such legislation would interfere with
extra-provincial creditors' rights. But since in most cases there would be
at least one creditor from outside the province, in practical terms the
result would have represented a general limitation on provincial
attempts to repudiate municipal debt. In short, despite suggestions that
the province has "sovereign authority" in this respect, the case falls far
short of establishing unlimited or unreviewable provincial authority to
nullify contractual rights.
In fact, in cases in which a province has purported to nullify
Crown contracts without some form of consent from the other
contracting party, the courts have almost always ruled the legislation
invalid.10 This fact is striking, given the repeated statements to the
97 bid. [emphasis added].
98 bid£
9 9 ibid. at 482.
100 See, for example, Credit Foncier Franco-Canadien v.Ross, [1937] 3 D.L.R. 365 (Alta.
C.A.), striking down Alberta legislation reducing interest on debts; Beauharnois Light, Heat and
Power Co. v. Hydro-Electric Power Commission, [1937] O.R. 796 (C.A.), striking down same
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effect that there is no limit on the right of a province to nullify
contractual rights "in the province." As in Upper Churchill Water or the
Royal Bank case, where the courts rule legislation invalid they typically
base their conclusion on the fact that the legislation affects extra-
provincial rights (even where the extra-provincial aspects of the
contracts in question may be relatively minor). But the proposition that
the province may unilaterally nullify contractual rights as long as those
rights are located "in the province" seems to have simply been assumed
to be correct, even in the absence of any direct authority on the point.
In short, the results in these cases, although admittedly not the
reasons relied on by the courts, are entirely consistent with the
conclusion that there is an implied limitation on provincial power to
repudiate contracts. Whenever provinces have acted in a high-handed
or arbitrary manner, repudiating contracts and denying compensation to
those affected without their consent, the courts have found a way to
intervene. I conclude that the provincial contract repudiation cases do
not represent an obstacle to the conclusion outlined earlier-namely,
that the unilateral power to rewrite contracts without the payment of
compensation is contrary to the rule of law.
2. No Guarantee for Property Rights
Judges and text writers who state that Parliament may rewrite
contract terms without paying compensation often assume that this
conclusion necessarily flows from the fact that Parliament may
expropriate property without paying compensation. There is
considerable judicial authority for the proposition that the state may
expropriate property without paying compensation.10 1 Any claim for
compensation must be found in a statute; in other words, there is no
common law right to compensation for legislation expropriating
property rights. While the courts will tend to interpret legislation which
involves a "taking" of property as implicitly requiring that compensation
legislation considered in the Ottawa Valley case; Independent Order of Foresters v. Bd. Trustees of
Lethbridge Northern Irrigation Dist., [1937] 4 D.L.R. 398 (Alta. S.C.), striking down Alberta
legislation reducing the rate of interest on all provincial government securities; Independent Order of
Foresters v. Bd. Trustees of Lethbridge Northern Irrigation Dist., [1937] 2 D.L.R. 109 (Alta. S.C.),,also
striking down Alberta legislation reducing the rate of interest on all provincial government
securities. In Day v. Victoria, [1938] 53 B.C.R. 140, the British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld
legislation restructuring the debt obligations of the City of Victoria, but the arrangement had been
approved by the City's creditors: see the recitals in the preamble to Victoria City Debt Restructuring
Act, S.B.C. 1937, c. 77.
101 See, generally, Manitoba Fisheries v. R., [1979] 1 S.C.R. 101 [hereinafter Manitoba
Fisheries].
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be paid, the obligation to pay compensation flows from the terms of the
statute rather than from any right at common law.
A number of respected commentators have pointed out that the
drafters of the 1982 Constitution expressly decided not to include any
protection for property rights in the Charter.102 Therefore, it is claimed,
the Canadian Parliament retains its plenary authority to expropriate
property without paying compensation. The power to expropriate
property, it is assumed, includes the power to expropriate contractual
fights without paying compensation.
The main difficulty with this line of argument is that it
incorrectly assumes that a generalized right to expropriate property
without paying compensation necessarily includes the right to rewrite
contract terms. In fact, the common law has never treated property and
contract claims in an identical fashion. For example, the common law
has never recognized that property owners are entitled to be
compensated whenever the value of their property is negatively affected
by legislation. Only in instances where the legislation amounts to a
"taking" does a claim for compensation arise and, even here, the right to
compensation flows from the terms of the statute rather than from any
common law right.103 But the common law has always maintained that a
person who has contracted with the government is entitled to be
compensated for any losses flowing from the government's failure to
keep its promise. While it has also been assumed that the Crown's
liability in contract could be limited through statute, absent such a
statute, the common law position would require compensation. In short,
those persons with whom the government has chosen to contract are in a
different position from a mere property-holder whose property might be
adversely affected by governmental or legislative action.
If we examine the cases stating that Parliament may expropriate
property without paying compensation, we see that they in no way justify
Parliament rewriting contractual terms without providing redress. For
example, in the leading case of Burmah Oil Co. v. Lord Advocate,104 the
House of Lords considered claims for compensation from British
companies whose property in Burma had been destroyed by order of the
British government during the Second World War. There was no statute
authorizing the destruction of the property, but the House of Lords held
102 See, for example, P.W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
1992) at 707.
103 See, generally, Manitoba Fisheries, supra note 101.
104 [1965] A.C. 75.
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that the destruction was lawful based on the prerogative power of the
Crown to protect its realm and citizens in times of war.105 However, by a
majority of 3-2, the House of Lords also held that the destruction of the
property, while lawful, gave rise to a right to compensation. The British
Parliament passed a statute, the War Damage Act, 1965,106 reversing the
judgment of the House of Lords. Section 1 of this Act provided as
follows:
(1) No person shall be entitled at common law to receive from the Crown compensation
in respect of damage to, or destruction of, property caused (whether before or after the
passing of this Act, within or outside the United Kingdom) by acts lawfully done by, or on
the authority of, the Crown during, or in contemplation of the outbreak of, a war in which
the Sovereign was, or is, engaged.10 7
While the validity of War Damage Act was never tested in court,
most commentators assume it to be valid. The enactment of the War
Damage Act is often cited as authority for the proposition that
Parliament may expropriate property, even if it involves overturning a
court award of damages against the Crown. But notice that the terms of
the statute only deny compensation in respect of acts "lawfully done." It
would not apply, in other words, to cases where the Crown had
destroyed property and denied compensation in breach of a contractual
obligation. For example, if the British government had expressly
provided, by contract, that it would compensate certain property owners
for damage caused during the war, nothing in the War Damage Act
would operate to override those contract terms. In short, while the War
Damage Act certainly stands for the proposition that Parliament may
expropriate property without paying compensation, it certainly does not
authorize Parliament's unilateral rewriting of contractual terms without
compensation.
The same analysis can be applied to all the other cases involving
expropriation of property rights. In all cases where the courts have
found that compensation was not payable, the statutes in question never
purported to rewrite the terms of a valid and binding contract.
Some may object that the distinction I seek to draw between
"mere" property claims, as opposed to claims for breach of contract, is
unduly technical or formalistic. In fact, the distinction is entirely
justified in principled terms. All forms of state regulation impose costs
on those who are regulated including, in some cases, decreasing the
1 0 5 See the judgments of Lords Reid, Pearce, and Upjohn, ibid.
106 (U.K.) c. 18 [hereinafter WarDamageAct].
10 7 1bid. [emphasis added].
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value of private property. It would be unjust to hold that property
owners alone, as opposed to consumers, employees, etc., are entitled to
be compensated for the costs of state regulation. But the person who
has contracted with the government is in a different position from a
mere property owner. First of all, those contracting with the
government are by no means limited to those with property. The Crown
contracts with its employees, or with the providers of services, as well as
with property holders. The only way that a contract claim can arise is if
the Crown voluntarily decides to make a legally-binding promise. If the
State wishes to avoid contractual liability, it may do so simply by
choosing not to enter into contracts.
It is the element of voluntariness that distinguishes claims in
contract from mere property claims. If the state were required to
compensate any property owner whose rights were adversely affected by
state regulation, the claims for compensation would be enormous and
unavoidable. But claims in contract are subject to limitation by the state
itself. If the state chooses to make legally binding promises-promises
which can be and are relied upon by the other contracting parties-then
it is entirely appropriate that it honour those commitments.
3. The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations
A final consideration is whether the implied limitations
associated with the rule of law would unduly limit the ability of the
Legislature to change legislation. As a general rule, governments cannot
bind their successors. It must be open to the legislature to change the
law in accordance with its evolving views of the public interest.
For example, in Reference Re Canada Assistance Plan,108 the
Supreme Court of Canada considered whether the doctrine of
"legitimate expectations" prevented the government from introducing
legislation limiting the government's contributions under a shared-cost
program with the provinces. Sopinka J., speaking for a unanimous
Supreme Court, rejected this suggestion:
Parliamentary government would be paralysed if the doctrine of legitimate expectations
could be applied to prevent the government from introducing legislation in Parliament.
Such expectations -might be created by statements during an election campaign. The
business of government would be stalled while the application of the doctrine and its
effect was argued out in the courts. Furthermore, it is fundamental to our system of
government that a government is not bound by the undertakings of its predecessors. The
108 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 [hereinafter cAP Reference].
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doctrine of legitimate expectations would place a fetter on this essential feature of
democracy.10 9
The CAP Reference leaves no doubt that the Crown cannot
contract away Parliament's right to enact legislation.110 But, in my view,
there is no inconsistency between this doctrine and the analysis that has
been presented in this paper. The implied limitations associated with
the rule of law-including the requirement that government honour its
promises-do not in any way limit the ability of the legislature to
implement policies that it deems to be in the public interest. The
government and Parliament are free to decide not to proceed with a
contract because they deem the contract to be contrary to the public
interest. All that Parliament may not do is to deny access to the courts
for persons whose rights are thereby affected.
Acceptance of this doctrine would not "paralyse" the operation
of Parliament or stall the business of government. This is evident by the
fact that the United States Constitution prohibits the States from
"impairing the Obligations of Contracts."'111 As originally drafted, the
Cccontracts clause" applied not only to government attempts to repudiate
its own contracts, but also to attempts by the state to rewrite the terms of
contracts between private parties. But in the modern era, the U.S.
Supreme Court has rarely invalidated legislation on the grounds that it
adjusted contractual rights as between private parties. This so-called
"ccontracts clause" has been interpreted as protecting, in particular, the
rights of persons who have contracted with the government.112 Yet this
limitation on legislative power has not prevented Congress or the States
109 ibid. at 559.
110 Although the case dealt with the doctrine of "legitimate expectations," Sopinka J. made it
clear that the result would not have been any different if there had been a binding contract that the
Crown sought to overturn: see ibid at 560.
111 U.S. Const. art. I, cl. 10 provides that "[n]o state shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts."
112 See Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). The leading modem
authority on point, adopting a narrow reading of the application of the contract clause in the context
of private contracts, is Home Building and Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). But see
Allied Structural Steel Company v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978), holding that legislation adjusting
the rights of contracting parties must be founded on reasonable conditions and must be of a
character appropriate to the public purpose justifying its adoption. Significantly, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has stated that no such judicial deference will be extended to efforts by the state to
repudiate its own contracts. This is because, as the Court noted in the leading case of U.S. Trust Co.
of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) [hereinafter U.S. Trust Co.], the state has an unhealty
economic incentive to renege on its contractual commitments whenever the gain in dollars or
convenience outweighs the loss in credibility.
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from pursuing policies they believed to be in the public interest 13 This
is because the U.S. Supreme Court has held that legislation impairing
contract rights can be upheld as long as the impairment is for an
important public purpose and is narrowly tailored to achieve that
purpose.114 A similar approach in Canada would provide meaningful
protection for contractual expectations, without unduly limiting the
authority of Parliament or the provincial legislatures.
V. THE RULE OF LAW APPLIED: IMPLICATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY
Assume that the argument that has been presented thus far is
correct and were accepted by a court. What would be the implications
for the constitutional validity of recent Canadian legislation, either
proposed or enacted, that purports to rewrite contract terms and deny
access to the courts?
Turning first to Bill C-22, it would seem clear that the legislation,
as originally proposed by the government in early 1994, would be
unconstitutional. The legislation purported to nullify a legally binding
contractual obligation and to completely bar all court access for
purposes of seeking redress. 'If the Constitution protects contractual
expectations, then legislation such as Bill C-22 must necessarily be
unconstitutional.
What of the government's proposed amendments to Bill C-22,
which would have permitted access to the courts for purposes of
claiming certain kinds of out-of-pocket expenses? 115  Is a partial
limitation on court access a violation of the rule of law?
The American jurisprudence on the "contracts clause" may be
helpful in responding to this question. As noted above, the U.S. courts
do not regard the "contracts clause" as a complete bar to contract
modification by Congress or the States. Rather, the courts require: (i)
that any contract modification be undertaken for a significant and
legitimate public purpose; and (ii) that the modification of contract
113 For a review of the modem American doctrine, see R. Rotunda & J. Nowak, Treatise on
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure, vol. 2, 2d ed. (St. Paul: West, 1992) at 447-56.
114 See the discussion under Part V, below.
115 The government amendments, proposed in early 1995, were rather complicated,
containing a host of exclusions designed to severely limit any claim for compensation. For a
discussion of some of the difficulties posed by various aspects of these exclusions, see Senate
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, supra note 11. In May 1996, further amendments
were introduced which broadened the right to claim damages against the Crown.
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obligations be narrowly tailored so as to promote the significant public
purpose identified.1 16 However, outside of cases of state insolvency, the
desire of the state to save money cannot be regarded, in itself, as a
significant public purpose: "a governmental entity can always find a use
for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to be raised. '117
The government might argue that based on this kind of "interest
balancing," the proposed amendments to Bill C-22 should be sufficient
to support its constitutional validity, even in light of the analysis set out
in this paper. In support of this conclusion, the government might point
to a review of the Airport Contracts conducted by Robert Nixon
immediately after the election of the Liberal Government in October
1993.118 The Nixon Report found that the process whereby the contracts
were awarded "may leave one with the suspicion that patronage had a
role in the selection of Paxport Inc. [as best overall proposal]." 119 Nixon
also found that the revenue stream provided to the Government of
Canada from the Airport Contracts was "far from overwhelming" while
the rate of return to the Limited Partnership responsible for
redeveloping the airport "could, given the nature of this transaction, well
be viewed as excessive." 120 The Nixon Report found that the Airport
Contracts simply do not serve the public interest and should be
cancelled. It also recommended that "it would be both necessary and
indeed desirable to provide reasonable compensation. 121  Such
compensation would include any expenditures incurred to date, but "it
would not be necessary in [Nixon's] view for these negotiations to
include compensation for lost opportunity or profits foregone. Given
the circumstances of this unhappy transaction, and the very early stage of
its life, there is no imperative for such compensation." 122
116 U.S. Trust Co., supra note 112 at 25,per Blackmun J., delivering the opinion of the Court:
"[a]s with laws impairing the obligations of private contracts, an impairment may be constitutional if
it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose."
117 Ibid. at 26. The Court went on to note that considerations might well be different in a
situation where a government was facing insolvency. In these kinds of exceptional situation, the
state must act to compromise debt in order to protect the rights of creditors as well as its own rights.
See ibM at 27-28, discussing Faitoute Iron and Steel Co. v. Asbury Park (City of), 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
118 "Pearson Airport Review" (29 November, 1993) [hereinafter "Nixon Report;"
unpublished].
119 See ibid. at 9.
120 Ibid. at 11.
12 1 Ibid. at 13.
122 jbij
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The difficulty with relying on the Nixon Report as a basis for
limiting compensation is that other independent and detailed audits of
the Airport Contracts had reached quite different conclusions.123 The
Nixon Report was prepared over a 30 day period through a closed-door
process that did not provide any guarantees of due process. The Nixon
Report itself essentially raises questions and concerns about the Airport
Contracts, as opposed to undertaking a detailed analysis of what
amounted to a very complicated commercial transaction. In short, it
seems difficult to conclude that the amended version of Bill C-22 could
be justified based on such an inconclusive and hastily prepared internal
review.124 On the other hand, the further amendments proposed by the
government in May 1996 broaden the right to seek compensation from
the courts, increasing the likelihood that the legislation would be found
to be valid.
What about other recent attempts by governments to rewrite
contractual terms and limit access to the courts? For example, a number
of provincial governments have enacted legislation rewriting collective
agreements with their employees and, in some cases, preventing court
actions for redress. In Ontario, the Social Contract Act, 1993,125
amended certain terms of collective agreements in the broader public
sector and barred proceedings based on the enactment of those
amendments 26 The Saskatchewan government enacted legislation
amending the notice requirements in its collective agreements, limiting
employees to the notice they would have received at common law, and
barring access to the courts for additional claims. 127
Governmental attempts to rewrite the terms of contracts have by
no means been limited to the employment context. In early 1995, the
British Columbia government cancelled a major hydro-electric project
and stated that no compensation would be payable to Alcan Aluminium
Limited, which had invested more than $500 million in the project.128 In
123 See Report of Price Waterhouse to Transport Canada (8 July 1992) [unpublished]; Report
of Raymond, Chabot, Martin, Par6 to Transport Canada (26 October 1992) [unpublished].
124 See the'extensive analysis of the cancellation of the Airport Contracts, Senate Committee
on the Pearson AirportAgreements, supra note 14.
12 5 S.O. 1993, c. 5.
126 See/bid, s. 47.
1 2 7 See The Crown Employment Contracts Act, S.S. 1991, c. 50.11, ss. 7 and 9.
128 See Province of British Columbia (Office of the Premier), News Release, "B.C.
Government Says No To Kemano Completion Project" 23 January 1995. While the government
had threatened to introduce legislation barring compensation by Alcan, in July 1995 the parties
entered into a "Standstill Agreement," providing for negotiations on the issue until 31 March 1996.
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1993, the Saskatchewan government introduced legislation rewriting the
terms of certain agreements that it had entered into with respect to a
heavy oil upgrader project, but the legislation was never proceeded with
when the parties agreed to a settlement of the issues.129
The facts and circumstances surrounding each of these pieces of
legislation would necessarily have to be examined in detail before any
conclusions respecting their constitutional validity could be offered.
Yet, in general terms, the analysis that has been presented in this paper
would suggest that all of these attempts to rewrite contract terms and
deny compensation would be open to serious constitutional challenge.
Some might question the appropriateness of this result,
particularly given the fiscal strait-jacket facing all governments in
Canada in the mid-1990s. If governments are forced to honour their
contractual commitments, this might be regarded as an unwarranted
impediment to efforts aimed at reducing public expenditures and
balancing budgets.
Yet, the short answer to this objection is that there is no reason
why expenditure reduction must be achieved by singling out those
persons who have contracted with the government. All the contracts in
question were freely entered into by the government of the day.
Honouring those contractual commitments simply requires that
expenditure reductions be achieved other than through unilateral
rewriting of binding contracts. Of course, the considerations might well
be different in a case where a government was facing insolvency. The
law generally recognizes that there must be a mechanism whereby
persons who are genuinely insolvent are able to compromise debt. The
same considerations would suggest that governments must necessarily
have some scope for altering their contractual commitments to deal with
a genuine threat of insolvency.1
30
While the rule of law requires that governments honour their
contractual commitments, it does not necessarily mean that governments
are required to meet or fulfill the expectations of citizens as to future
public policy. As the Supreme Court of Canada noted in the cAP
Reference, it is simply impossible for governments to satisfy the
expectations of all citizens, even if those expectations are reasonable in
the circumstances. Some citizens may have developed reasonable
expectations to the effect that the government's current policy on a
129 See The NewGrade Energy Inc. Protection Act, S.S. 1993, c. N-4.02.
130 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the compromise of state debt in this
situation, assuming it is undertaken in a reasonable fashion, does not violate the contract clause.
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
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particular subject will not be changed; others may expect, equally
reasonably, that such policies will be substantially altered. To require
government to act in accordance with "legitimate expectations" would,
indeed, paralyze the operation of the Parliamentary system.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that governments should be bound to the
same moral standards as private citizens when its comes to the making
and breaking of promises. Yet, at first blush, such a requirement might
be thought to unduly limit the ability of the government of the day to
achieve its preferred public policy objectives. In fact, however, the
suggested limitations will operate to the long-term benefit of the state,
rather than to its detriment. If governments are permitted to repudiate
contracts at will, the state is effectively barred from undertaking
permanently binding commitments. Anyone who is contemplating
contracting with the government will be aware of the fact that, no matter
how solemn the promise, the government can turn around the next day
and "skip out" on the contract. This risk may lead the other party to
decide that it would be better off investing its resources elsewhere, injurisdictions which do offer protection for contractual expectations;
alternatively, the private party may demand that the government pay a
premium in order to discount the risk of future opportunistic behaviour
by the state.
If contractual expectations are constitutionally protected, this
risk premium is eliminated. This will facilitate the achievement of public
policy goals, rather than impair them. It will also ensure that short-term
political expediency is not permitted to undermine the core values
associated with the rule of law-values that serve the long-term interests
of both citizens and governments alike.
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